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Abstract
This article explores the position of industrial 
internet platforms (IIP) in manufacturing value 
chains. We develop an understanding of the role 
of data in global value chains (GVCs), referring 
to literature on intangible assets and theories on 
platform business models. We use data from a qua-
litative empirical study based on 45 interviews on 
platforms active on the German market to answer 
(1) whether there are tendencies of oligopolization 
that lead to an accumulation of power on the side 
of the platforms, and (2) whether it is the platforms 
that capture most of the gains derived from hig-
her productivity or lower transaction costs. The 
analysis shows that platforms mainly act as ser-
vice providers and/or intermediaries that support 
manufacturing companies in reaping benefits from 
data. While the relationship between platforms and 
manufacturers currently corresponds to a symbio-
sis, a stronger power imbalance could evolve in the 
future since processes of oligopolization are likely.
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1 Introduction
New digital technologies are about to transform 
the economy as we know it. By combining steep 
increases in computing power, the abundance of data 
from all sorts of transactions and new methods of 
analysing and learning from such data (Brynjolfsson 
& McAfee, 2014), equipment manufacturers and 
software providers are able to offer a broad variety 
of ‘new digital technologies’ (Sturgeon, 2019) which 
promise to enhance the capacities of their (industrial) 
customers. Partly this is about new technological 
artefacts. There is significant technological progress 
in the fields of collaborative robotics, modularized 
automation lines, digital assistance systems, 3D 
printers and other types of material equipment. 
In this contribution, however, we depart from the 
hypothesis that the more fundamental changes for 
industrial organization rest on developments that 
one cannot touch or see: the recursive processes of 
data generation, analysis and usage that increasingly 
shape business models and enterprise organization 
in global value chains (GVCs).
The term ‘industrial internet’ describes such new 
possibilities for process rationalization and business 
model innovation related to the analysis of data in 
the industrial context. Such options concern the 
optimization of processes (e.g. production scheduling, 
maintenance, quality control), the improvement 
of products by making use of life-cycle data (i.e. 
connected car, smart home, etc.), and the data-
based match making in business-to-business (B2B) 
transactions. Digital platforms (henceforth: “Industrial 
Internet- platforms”, IIP) are important facilitators 
of such approaches. Just like in the field of the 
consumer-oriented internet, they take on the position 
as infrastructures of digitized transactions and 
enable manufacturers to take advantage of software 
applications to analyse industry-related data (Acatech, 
2015; BDI, 2019; Graff, Krenz, & Kronenwett, 2018).
The effects of such transformations on GVCs and the 
specific roles that IIP take on within them are virtually 
unknown. Most of the research on the digitalization 
of manufacturing has focused on technological 
artefacts like robots or digital assistance systems 
and their implications on the shopfloor (Briken, 
Chillas, Krzywdzinski, & Marks, 2017; Ford, 2016; 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2016). Debates on the impact 
of digital platforms on economic organization, on 
the contrary, have focused on the role of large tech 
companies of the consumer-oriented internet that 
have disrupted the field of media, communication 
and retail (Dolata, 2015; Kenney & Zysman, 2016; 
Staab, 2019; Zuboff, 2015). The industrial internet 
and platforms as its infrastructural backbone are still 
at an early stage of implementation as they become 
only meaningful with their diffusion in enterprises, 
which has just begun to take off. Correspondingly, 
empirical research that traces the possible outcomes 
of the platformization of industries on GVCs is 
scarce. First contributions have outlined possible 
trajectories with regard to the opportunities for 
industrial upgrading of suppliers (Humphrey, 
2018; Sturgeon, 2019), the competition between 
tech companies and manufacturers in the field 
(Lechowski & Krzywdzinski, 2019; Ziegler, 2020), 
and possible effects on the governance of industries 
(Lüthje, 2019; Thun & Sturgeon, 2019, Author).
Our contribution adds to the emerging literature 
on the subject by focusing on the relationship 
between industrial companies and IIP. By means of 
a qualitative study on the business practices of IIP in 
Germany, we aim to answer the question of whether 
IIP as economic agents will assume an equally 
powerful position in the industrial field as their peers 
in the consumer-oriented internet. More specifically 
we ask: (1) Do IIP emerge as agents that capture most 
of the gains from higher productivity and/or lower 
transaction costs, or does the relationship between 
IIP and industrial customers amount to a symbiosis 
with shared benefits? (2) Are there tendencies of 
oligopolization in the field of IIP?
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To answer these questions, we first develop a 
theoretical understanding of the role of IIP in GVCs 
by discussing the relationship between ‘intangible 
assets’, data, and platforms (sections 2 and 3). We 
then operationalize these insights and introduce the 
subject-matter and the methods of our investigation, 
focusing on two types of platforms: production-
centred and distribution-centred platforms (sections 
4 and 5). In section 6 and 7 the empirical material 
is presented with a focus on platform business 
models and the variables that define their position 
in GVCs. In the final section we conclude that 
due to significant differences between business 
models in the consumer-oriented and the industrial 
internet, the position of IIP rather resembles one 
of strategically important service providers and/
or intermediaries that participate in the value 
creation networks of digitalized manufacturing 
than that of an oligopoly that expands its reach on 
cost of manufacturers. However, tendencies of an 
oligopolization could evolve in the future, especially 
in the field of distribution-centred platforms.
2 Intangible assets and value distribution in GVCs
The strategic role of IIP is linked to the increasing 
significance of data in fragmented production 
networks. The application of the Internet of Things 
(IoT) as a means of generating and connecting 
data from industrial processes radically enhances 
the volumes and accuracy of up-to-date (or even 
real-time) data (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; 
Sturgeon, 2019). Artificial Intelligence provides 
new possibilities to make economic use of this 
data by detecting patterns, making predictions and 
improving processes based on the sheer amount of 
available data and distributed computing power.
Even though the economic significance of data, often 
dubbed the ‘new oil’, is widely recognized, their role 
for inter-firm relations in GVCs is not theoretically 
explored sufficiently with few exceptions (Foster 
& Graham, 2017; Sturgeon, 2019). The role of 
knowledge-intensive production factors described 
as ‘intangible assets’, however, lies at the core of 
theory building on GVCs (Durand & Milberg, 
2020; Kaplinsky, 2020; Mudambi, 2008). In what 
follows, we will first review the existing insights 
on intangibles as they were taken up in GVC theory 
and then discuss the role of data in this context, 
which we interpret as an increasingly important 
resource for the production of intangibles.
The term ‘intangibles’ refers to intellectual or 
knowledge assets (Lev, 2001). These can comprise of 
legally defensible titles such as patents, copyrights and 
brands but also consist of organizational structures, 
inter-organizational relationships and human creativity 
(Mudambi, 2008). It has been empirically shown that 
intangible assets, in spite of some inherent problems 
regarding their monetarization, are generating an 
increasing share of returns, roughly a third of all 
production factors (Alsamawi et al., 2020; Mudambi, 
2008). According to Haskel and Westlake (2017) the 
measurable impact of intangibles is only partially 
represented in its de-facto impact on business models 
and competition. In a knowledge-intensive ‘capitalism 
without capital’, the generation of rents through the 
capture and monetarization of intangibles plays an 
ever more prominent role.
Crucially, intangibles are allocated unevenly in 
disintegrated value chains. Intangible assets tend 
to be concentrated in activities that are allocated 
prior or after the actual manufacturing process, i.e. 
in R&D or design activities on the one hand and in 
marketing, advertising and after-sales services on 
the other (Mudambi, 2008). This polarization is 
often explained in alignment to Vernon’s product life 
cycle model: pure-play manufacturing activities can 
easily be replicated (especially by firms in emerging 
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economies). They hence become ‘commoditized’, 
i.e. easily exchanged by other suppliers in off-the-
shelf transactions, and are exposed to price pressures. 
Pre- and post-production activities, on the contrary, 
are more difficult to copy and often include a service 
dimension that is customized according to users’ 
preferences (Kaplinsky, 2020; Mudambi, 2008). While 
empirical studies on some industries confirmed this 
pattern (e.g. Ali-Yrkkö, Rouvinen, Seppälä, & Ylä-
Anttila, 2011; Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, & de 
Vries, 2014), the equation of low-value added activities 
with manufacturing is oversimplified. Especially in 
innovation-intensive producer-driven commodity 
chains (Gereffi, 1994), value creation crucially 
depends on the permanent adjustment of processes in 
recursive innovation processes that are partly related 
to practical shop floor knowledge (Herrigel & Zeitlin, 
2010; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014).
3 Intangibles and data
The question of whether or not a firm can develop 
intangibles touches a great variety of questions from 
the general characteristics of a region’s innovation 
system, the innovative capabilities of a firm, the 
conditions for technology transfer to the availability 
of a suitably trained workforce and the specific 
company cultures. While some of these factors rely 
on the general institutional and political context in 
which GVCs are embedded and some remain the 
domain of proper lab-level basic innovation, others 
rely on incremental improvements of products and 
processes based on information that is gathered from 
customers or shop floor experiences (Herrigel, 2018; 
Herrigel & Zeitlin, 2010). This requires feedback 
loops from customers’ user experience to product 
developers (product innovation) or from shop floor 
performance to process design (process innovation). 
As Michael Porter and Victor Miller (1985) argue, 
‘[e]very value activity has both a physical and an 
information-processing component. The physical 
component includes all the physical tasks required 
to perform the activity. The information-processing 
component encompasses the steps required to 
capture, manipulate, and channel the data necessary 
to perform the activity.’ The information-processing 
component can be used to manipulate and improve 
the physical component.
The history of industrial organization to a significant 
degree revolves around the question of how to make 
use of information derived from manufacturing 
processes and markets (Baukrowitz et al., 2006). 
Taylorist scientific management, for instance, rested 
on a detailed mapping of the work process by taking 
the time of each production step manually and using 
this data to comprehensively redesign the workflow. 
The organizational revolution of lean production in 
the 1990s increased flexibilization by improving the 
way information was transmitted along the supply 
chain based on Kanban and Kaizen techniques 
(Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990). As supply 
chains disintegrated and became more complex, 
rationalization became a matter of ‘systemic 
rationalization’ of the supply chain (Altmann, Deiß, 
Döhl, & Sauer, 1986), resulting in the rise of supply 
chain management as a separate management 
discipline and systematic supply chain monitoring 
as one of its major instruments. All of these 
processes were accompanied by the intensification 
of ‘codification, standardization and monitoring of 
the workflow’ (Durand & Milberg, 2020, p. 408).
The growing need for the coordination of processes 
in complex value chains and the possibilities to use 
software to facilitate the monitoring and recursive 
adaptation of processes gave rise to industrial 
information systems, in particular systems for supply 
chain management, Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) and Manufacturing Execution (MES). Such 
software facilitated the adjustment of production 
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processes to market demand based on production-
related data. In addition, social media data and data on 
B2C transactions also began to play an important role 
in detecting consumers’ preferences and developing 
appropriate marketing and product design strategies. 
Brand building, a prerequisite for rent generation in 
consumer industries, increasingly relied on market 
intelligence, i.e. data on consumer behaviour (Pfeiffer, 
2021; Rikap, 2020). Digital data thus has played an 
ever increasing role for firms’ abilities of product 
design and (dynamic) process innovation. [1]
The technological progress towards the IoT, i.e. 
the ability to generate high-resolution data from 
real-life processes and to connect this data from 
different devices at a unitary data layer, enhances 
the possibility to support key enterprise functions 
through data-based intangibles (Ziegler, 2020, pp. 
27–52). Progress in Machine Learning but also 
more traditional methods of data analysis can 
help to utilize large data sets in order to detect 
patterns, predict future developments and integrate 
automated decision making in management 
functions. IIP are needed to integrate and use this 
data in order to use software applications and 
to improve the matchmaking between industrial 
customers and suppliers.
4 Platforms as agents in value chains: analytical cornerstones 
for the empirical analysis
As there’s an enhanced importance of data that can 
be utilized in order to generate value, the question 
of how it can be used and who benefits from it 
becomes paramount. For this end, firms need to rely 
on a cloud infrastructure and on platform solutions 
that can connect different sets of data and integrate 
software applications to analyse it. This provides 
industrial customers with advantages of enhanced 
productivity and/or reduced transaction costs, but it 
also puts the owners of cloud and platform services 
in a potentially powerful position, particularly if IIP 
owners can acquire and monetarize customers’ data. 
Such strategies have been a cornerstone of platform 
business models in the consumer-oriented internet, 
where platforms sell user data for advertising 
purposes (Srnicek, 2016; Zuboff, 2015). However, 
it can be expected that tighter requirements for the 
secrecy of the data by industrial customers constitutes 
a limitation to replicate such strategies in the field 
of the industrial internet. Thus the conditions under 
which platform business models can expand and 
the potential effects on the relationship between 
platforms and manufacturers need to be investigated 
in order to arrive at a concrete analysis of power 
relations in this emerging field.
A related question concerns the oligopolization of 
platforms. In the consumer-oriented internet, digital 
platforms in the field of e-commerce (Amazon), 
social media (Facebook), and web services (Google) 
soon reached a market-dominating position. Their 
success rests on the creation of ecosystems that 
offer customers attractive options through network 
effects and other distinct features of platform-
based business models (Abdelkafi, Raasch, Roth, 
& Srinivasan, 2019; Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 
2019; Dolata, 2015). As platforms in the industrial 
realm replicate some of the strategies of their peers 
in the consumer-oriented internet, similar processes 
of oligopolization might emerge.
Based on these considerations, we pursue the 
following research questions in our empirical study:
(1) Are there tendencies of oligopolization in the 
field of IIP?
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(2) Do IIP emerge as agents that capture most of 
the gains from higher productivity and/or lower 
transaction costs, or does the relationship between 
IIP and industrial customers amount to a symbiosis 
with shared benefits?
We hypothesize that both questions are related. In 
case a general tendency towards oligopolization 
prevails, the succeeding platform providers will be 
in a good position to set the terms vis-à-vis their 
industrial customers, i.e. to capture significant 
gains from data-based intangibles. If, however, 
a fragmented market structure prevails, IIP will 
rather take on the role of specialized service 
providers. Customers would find it easy to switch 
providers who would be chosen according to the 
specificity and quality of their services in a more 
equitable relationship.
4.1 Platforms and their functions
In order to tackle the research questions, a refined 
understanding of platform business models is 
needed. In what follows, we relate the theoretical 
literature on platform business models in general 
(Cusumano et al., 2019; Gawer & Cusumano, 
2014; McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2017) to the field 
of IIP. We follow the definition by Cusumano et 
al. (2019) who state that industry platforms ‘bring 
together individuals and organizations so they can 
innovate or interact in ways not otherwise possible, 
with the potential for nonlinear increases in utility 
and value’ (Cusumano et al., 2019, p. 13).
The ability to enhance the benefits for users by 
drawing on the resources of the entire ecosystem 
takes on different forms according to the core 
functions of a platform. Cusomano et al., (2019, pp. 
18–21) distinguish between innovation platforms 
and transaction platforms. The former aim at 
the extension of a platform’s functions through 
complementary contributions by ecosystem 
partners (henceforth: complementors). Platforms 
thus act as integrators in open innovation systems 
with a multiplicity of contributors (Chesbrough, 
2003). Transaction platforms pursue a different 
strategy as they take on the role as intermediaries 
by setting up online marketplaces, i.e. they facilitate 
transactions while reducing transaction costs[2]. 
This distinction between ideal types of platforms 
roughly corresponds to the divergent trajectories of 
IIP that can be observed in recent empirical studies 
on the subject (Lüthje, 2019):
Production-centred platforms are integrators of 
software applications (apps), which industrial cus-
tomers can adjust according to their needs. We inter-
pret production-centred platforms as a type of inno-
vation platform as their core rationale concerns the 
supply of a software ecosystem through the add-ons 
by complementors (or self-developed apps). Such 
platforms are established by firms that have expe-
rience with prior generations of production-related 
information systems and/or are large manufacturers 
themselves. Prominent platforms of this type are: 
Siemens Mindsphere, Bosch IoT-Suite and IBM’s 
Watson IoT. These enterprises offer services to a 
large variety of industries from mechanical engi-
neering to automotive and chemical products and 
the energy or mobility sector. Niche-solutions that 
specialize on one industry or sub-industry and its 
specific requirements do exist as well.
Distribution-centred platforms are transaction plat-
forms that act as matchmakers between manufac-
turers of supply products and industrial customers. 
They take the task of finding reliable suppliers off a 
company’s hands by curating and auditing a diverse 
and far-flung network of manufacturers specialized 
in different processes. Such platforms can be ob-
served in heterogeneous industries such as consum-
er goods manufacturing in China and the mechani-
cal component manufacturing industry worldwide.
As described in the theoretical literature (Cusumano 
et al., 2019, pp. 19–21), a hybridization of platform 
approaches can be observed in the industrial field 
as well. Production-centred platforms also serve as 
transaction platforms since software applications 
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are traded on their marketplaces (‘app stores’). 
Likewise, distribution-centred platforms can com-
plement their transaction features by add-on soft-
ware functionalities that facilitate these transac-
tions. However, the distinction between innovation 
and transaction platforms is a useful point of de-
parture for the analysis of business models in the 
respective fields, as they show different character-
istics according to the main type of platform under 
consideration (Cusumano et al., 2019, pp. 77–104).
4.2 Platform business models
The analysis of the platforms’ business models is 
organized according to a categorization that is de-
rived from studies on business models in the B2C 
segment (Fleisch, Weinberger, & Wortmann, 2014; 
Timmers, 1998) and adapted by Ziegler (2020, p. 
92) for the analysis of IIP. It distinguishes between 
value proposition, platform architecture, and rev-
enue model in order to analyse the relationship of 
platforms towards the participants in the ecosystem 
and its ability to capture value.
The value proposition crucially depends on the 
ability to integrate software services according to 
the domain-specific requirements of manufactur-
ers. Hence, platform owners need to combine skills 
from the field of IoT software development with 
an intimate knowledge of the processes of their 
customers. Production-centred platforms in par-
ticular need to master the challenges of integrating 
different types of equipment and ensuring the in-
teroperability of data in a heterogeneous and ap-
plication-specific context (PC2, PC4a)[3]. Distri-
bution-centred platforms face less challenges of 
integrating the data from ecosystems participants 
as they mostly do not monitor production processes 
but just the transaction processes. However, they 
need to possess a good knowledge of the products 
traded through their platforms in order to engage in 
matchmaking successfully and to provide effective 
quality control (DC1, DC2. DC3). As in the con-
sumer-oriented internet, the utility of a platform’s 
services depends on the richness of an ecosystem 
around it. Hence, the success of a platform’s value 
proposition significantly depends on architectural 
decisions with regard to their ecosystems through 
which network effects can be achieved.
Platform architectures concern the ecosystem rules 
for the various actors that are involved in platform 
business models, affecting the power relation be-
tween them and the economic prospects of the 
business models as a whole. Transaction platforms 
curate the networks of service providers or sell-
ers through various activities including the defini-
tion of rules of access, user-generated evaluation 
schemes, insurance and fraud prevention measures 
and the monitoring of service provision (Cusumano 
et al., 2019; Dolata, 2015; Kenney, Rouvinen, Sep-
pälä, & Zysman, 2019). Innovation platforms need 
to manage their network of co-inventors to ensure 
their productive interactions with the platform and 
avoid possible frictions. What is more, they need 
to decide upon the degree of openness of their plat-
forms on a continuum between proprietary models 
in which the control by the platform owners is tight 
and more open models of governance (Cusumano 
et al., 2019, pp. 88–90).
The character and strength of network effects de-
pend on these decisions. Same-side network effects 
happen when the utility for each user rises with the 
number of users that take advantage of the same 
service. Cross-side network effects, on the contrary, 
concern different groups of platform users (Cusu-
mano et al., 2019, p. 17), i.e. when a customer of a 
transaction platform benefits from a far-flung net-
work of producers of goods or services that are at-
tached to such a platform. In order to benefit from 
network effects, platform providers need to gain 
enough weight by attracting a sufficient number of 
users on all sides of the platform..
The revenue model concerns the different ways 
by which platforms generate income through var-
ious kinds of subscription models or direct fees on 
transactions. There is a tension between the mone-
DATA AND DIGITAl PlATFoRMS IN INDUSTRY \ 10
tary business interests of platform owners and their 
business strategy that aims at a rapid expansion of 
a platform’s reach and the exploitation of network 
effects. Freemium models, in which premium users 
pay for add-on services that go beyond the basic 
free services offered to everyone, are one way of 
dealing with this tension. Another prominent strat-
egy aims at the monetarization of user data for ad-
vertising purposes, i.e. the generation of revenues 
from additional sources than the primary users of 
the platform (Fleisch et al., 2014).
5 Research design and methods
In the following empirical analysis, we will relate 
the above reviewed theoretical insights on plat-
forms’ business models and the concerns about 
increasing platform power vis-à-vis other ecosys-
tem participants to the field of IIP. By this ap-
proach, we gain insights into the characteristics 
of an industrial platform economy, a section of 
the platform economy which has barely been sub-
ject to empirical research. By systematically ana-
lysing the platforms’ business models at the lev-
el of ‘value proposition’, ‘platform architecture’ 
and ‘revenue model’, and identifying possible 
sources of power that affect the platforms’ rela-
tionship to industrial companies and processes of 
oligopolization, we provide a differentiated per-
spective on the dynamics of the platform econ-
omy in the industrial realm. In order to identify 
potential sources of power of the emerging plat-
forms, we follow Ziegler’s inductively developed 
notion of ‘points of control’, which are strategi-
cally important aspects of a business model that 
can enable a platform to exercise some degree of 
control over other ecosystem participants, while 
simultaneously harvesting the benefits of collab-
oration with partners in their ecosystems. As a 
synthesis of the conducted expert interviews as 
well as an evaluation of the literature on platform 
business models, Table 1 provides an overview of 
such points of control that are associated with the 
three dimensions of a platforms’ business model.
Table 1: Analytical dimensions and ‘points of control’
Dimensions of business model Points of control
Value  
proposition
Domain-specific competences in IT





Rule setting vis-à-vis complementors
Prescriptions with regard to data governance
Performance monitoring of other agents
Revenue model Direct fees
Pay-per-use
Advertising of third parties
Sale of complementary services & products
Source: Authors, based on Timmers (1998) and Ziegler (2020).
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The analysis is based on 45 interviews gathered 
between January 2020 and May 2021 with three 
groups of actors in the field of the industrial internet: 
representatives of IIP, platform complementors 
and experts. IIP cases encompass five production- 
and three distribution-centred platforms active in 
Germany. All interview partners are involved in 
strategy building within those companies and have 
an intimate knowledge of the industrial platform 
economy. In addition, we talked to representatives 
of seven complementors of distribution-centred 
platforms, i.e. manufacturing partners, and to four 
complementors of production-centred platforms that 
contribute Software applications. The interviewed 
experts include representatives of industry 
associations, trade unions and research institutions.
The selection of platforms is based on a mapping of 
the production- and distribution-centred platform-
landscape in Germany identifying the most relevant 
players and highlighting the variety of approaches. 
The five production-centred platforms included 
in this study can be considered the most relevant 
platforms in Germany concerning size and recent 
growth trajectory. They have varying backgrounds 
in manufacturing and/or industrial and enterprise 
software. The selection of distribution-centred 
platforms likewise was conducted according to 
economic relevance. The case studies focus on the 
field of on-demand manufacturing of mechanical 
parts, an industrial segment where such approaches 
are prominently explored and practised.
Interviews with platform operators and experts 
were designed as semi-structured interviews and 
covered three topics: platforms functionalities 
and architecture, the platform’s business model 
and strategy, and its relationship to other actors 
in the field, particularly to industrial customers or 
complementors. Emphasis was adjusted depending 
on the interviewee group: While questions were 
focused on industry-level developments and 
broader trends in expert interviews, the interviews 
with platform operators focused on the details of the 
platforms’ business models. In the case of platform 
complementors, the focus of the interviews lay on 
their relationship with platform operators, their 
experiences in the cooperation and the question of 
how it affected their business development.
The data from the interviews was transcribed and 
analysed according to the method of qualitative 
content analysis using a mainly deductive, i.e. 
theory-oriented, method of coding and an analytical 
method that aims at the summarization of findings 
(Mayring, 2015). The following sections entail 
brief descriptions of the main findings that are 
structured according to the above-mentioned 
analytical categories.
6 Production-centred platforms: infrastructure oligopolies or 
service providers?
6.1 Value proposition: facilitating the use of 
data for enhanced productivity
Production-centred platforms promise the facilitation 
of a broad range of process improvements through 
the use of industrial data, often summarized under 
the term “Industry 4.0” (Platform Industrie 4.0, n.d.). 
Customers can choose from a variety of software 
applications (Software as a Service – SaaS) that 
can be accessed according to the specific needs of 
their enterprise. Typical applications include tools 
to monitor and optimize the production flow, for 
instance by the real time detection of deviances and 
the rearrangement of the process sequence, through 
which bottlenecks can be avoided and resource usage 
minimized. Another prominent focus is (predictive) 
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equipment maintenance, through the provision of 
data-based forecasts about when certain types of 
equipment typically wear out. Yet another issue is 
the virtual modelling of physical assets as digital 
twins that can be used for controlling the state of 
equipment, processes and products as well as for 
their simulation and virtual manipulation.
The platform ecosystem in the emerging field of 
production-centred platforms comprises of various 
layers with different functionalities (Graff et al., 
2018; Lechowski & Krzywdzinski, 2019). The 
IoT platforms as such (or “Platform-as-a-service”, 
PaaS) deal with the integration of Software 
applications (SaaS) that are either self-produced 
or sourced from third parties. Hence, the value 
proposition of the platform depends on the ability 
to provide or source SaaS elements that enlarge 
the scope of functionalities customers can access. 
As in other areas of the platform economy, the 
physical computing power is mostly not provided 
by the platform operators, but outsourced to 
“Infrastructure-as-a-Service” (IaaS) providers, 
most prominently to Amazon Web Services (AWS) 
and Microsoft Azure. These also offer generic 
services of data analysis and structuring to their 
customers, but as of yet do neither possess the 
domain-specific knowledge nor the ambition to 
move beyond their role as infrastructure service 
providers (IP1). However, the boundary between 
PaaS and IaaS is fluid, which raises concerns of 
whether companies such as AWS will crowd out 
genuine PaaS approaches in the future (Lechowski 
& Krzywdzinski, 2019).
While the conviction that the IoT provides great 
opportunities to generate revenues from industrial 
data is widespread among the participants in 
the field, the implementation of IIoT solutions 
is still at an early stage. There is a great deal of 
experimentation with few applications exceeding 
the trial phase of use cases or test-beds. Accordingly, 
the business models of platforms are still evolving. 
The same applies to the composition of the field as 
such: many firms have become active in the field of 
the industrial internet. A consolidation is likely in 
mid-term and the boundaries, the division of labour 
and the value distribution between different players 
is in flux (Graff et al., 2018). This also concerns the 
questions of the relationship between platforms, 
complementors and customers. The various players 
of production-centred platforms’ ecosystems 
compete with each other for capturing value, but 
they also need to cooperate for the sake of the joint 
interest in creating value from data.
6.2 Platform architectures: balancing rela-
tionships to customers and complementors
The most important architectural decisions that 
affect the relationship between participants in the 
production-centred platforms’ ecosystems concern 
questions of openness and interoperability. Most 
manufacturing firms operate a variety of equipment 
types, generations and brands that often result in 
a heterogeneous landscape of controlling software. 
Under such circumstances, platform strategies that 
would aim at proprietary and closed solutions, i.e. 
software infrastructures that only connect a certain 
type of machines and cannot be modified by third 
parties, are not feasible. Instead, platforms need to 
provide an open infrastructure for manufacturers 
to connect their heterogeneous machine parks, 
corresponding machine software and data. A 
manager at a production-centred platform describes 
this requirement for openness, that was emphasized 
in many interview of our study, as follows:
On the one hand, everyone is aware that such platforms 
only work if they have a certain relevance. If a certain 
share of market participants is involved there, and that 
probably doesn’t work if I say: “that’s exclusive and 
only works with my machines”. Then customers would 
say: “wait a minute, this is a silo solution after all! I don’t 
want that.” That means it’s a game, where you say: “yes I 
know, I have to open up to competitors.” (PC1) [4]
Therefore, openness and compatibility of platforms 
with multiple equipment producers’ software and 
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with applications of other third party developers 
is a precondition for production-centred platforms 
to attract customers on a larger scale. However, 
openness comes with a price: it is not possible to 
single-handedly define the technological standards 
of the operating systems and require other agents 
to adhere to them (as for instance Microsoft could 
do in closed PC architectures). Instead, all platforms 
need to demonstrate their openness towards 
software developers’ and customers’ needs in order 
to maximize their utility. The result is a delicate 
balancing game in which the platform providers need 
to find the right approach of keeping the services 
offered on their platform diverse (by cooperating 
with other actors in the field) while simultaneously 
navigating between their own and complementors’ 
goals to generate revenues from such services.
While openness and interoperability are the 
architectural foundations for platforms to generate 
use value for customers, the success of production-
centred platform business models depends on the 
abilities to exploit network effects as well. In order to 
benefit from same-side network effects, a platform 
would need to be able to provide functionalities that 
proportionally increase their utility with the number 
of users. There is a potential for such approaches as 
software packages (e.g. for predictive maintenance 
or for optical quality control) could be continuously 
improved by incorporating data from an increasing 
number of users, especially if they are built on 
machine learning approaches.
However, in contrast to private consumers who 
have tended to submit their data willingly (or 
unknowingly) to platforms of the consumer-
oriented internet, industrial companies are highly 
sceptical about sharing their data with platforms. 
This is confirmed in a recent survey by the German 
Economic Institute and the Foundation of German 
Industries has shown (IW & DBI, 2021) and was 
also emphasized by our interview partners:
Well, we do have a certain data hysteria [...], so that in 
some cases we are even discussing about machine run-
ning times with customers. That means data is transmit-
ted to us that says: yesterday the machine ran 28 percent 
– and it doesn’t even say which machine it is, it’s anony-
mized. And I think, a rethinking will have to take place 
to a certain extent there [...]. Nobody can do anything 
with it [the data], but we can use it to make benchmarks, 
to play back a certain feedback, etc. (com1PC)
The concerns over the sharing of data are a constraint 
to the establishment of platforms’ business 
models. It is common business practice among 
all production-centred platforms of this sample to 
ensure that the data stays with the customers and 
is not appropriated by the platforms or transmitted 
to third parties (Siemens, 2017, p. 9). At the same 
time, the experimental and negotiated sharing of 
data is explored in so-called data cooperatives 
and test bed projects with temporal data-sharing 
agreements (Werling, Weber, & Lasi, 2020).
While same-side network effects thus are difficult 
to incorporate into the platforms’ business models, 
cross-side network effects – the more users, the more 
attractive the platform becomes to complementors 
and the other way around (Cusumano et al., 2019, 
p. 17) – are important and could contribute to a 
consolidation of the platform landscape. These 
primarily concern the relationship between SaaS 
complementors and manufacturing companies that 
take advantage of the applications offered by them. 
The broader the software ecosystem a platform 
offers, the higher its attractiveness for customers and 
vice-versa: SaaS providers can only be attracted if 
a platform can guarantee access to many customers 
who can be charged for the use of their software. In 
order to establish itself successfully on the market, 
a platform thus needs to engage in cooperation and 
ecosystem-building with complementors:
DATA AND DIGITAl PlATFoRMS IN INDUSTRY \ 14
One thing is we develop the infrastructure in the first pla-
ce. […]. But then of course there are many third parties 
out there who then develop compatible solutions. And 
here we are doing our best to promote the largest possib-
le ecosystem, because that’s what will decide success or 
failure at the end of the day. Nobody at [platform name] 
can do that him- or herself. [...] (PC1)
This need for compatibility also pushes the 
platforms towards openness with regard to their 
core software elements. This is described by Ziegler 
(2020, pp. 247–254) in his case study of a IIP run by 
an industrial company that progressively opened up 
its software development until fully turning Open 
Source in order to maximise its compatibility and 
integration with SaaS complementors.
The need to attract a vibrant ecosystem of SaaS 
providers around the platforms’ core affects the 
bargaining position of platforms. Ideally, they can 
offer access to a large number of potential customers 
by integrating SaaS elements into their platform 
ecosystem. Unlike with the app stores Google 
Play or Apple App Store in the consumer-oriented 
internet that monopolize the distribution of smart 
phone apps, software developers can distribute 
their apps through different channels and quit the 
relationship with a platform altogether in case 
their interests are not met. The platforms need to 
negotiate and cooperate with their complementors 
on an equal footing, at least as long as the platform 
landscape remains fragmented and no single 
platform emerges as a dominant channel through 
which software applications are distributed.
6.3 Revenue models: participating from pro-
ductivity gains through services provision
The integration of generic software elements 
into industrial processes requires a great amount 
of adaptation and specification. Often this also 
involves the installation of infrastructure (sensors, 
hardware hubs, edge computing devices and 
the like). All interviewed representatives of 
production-centred platforms stressed the high 
requirements on domain-specific knowledge. 
Standardized and generic data-analysis tools have 
to be adjusted to the requirements of each specific 
domain including the fine-tuning between the 
software and the specific machinery or equipment 
it is integrated with. A generic visual recognition 
tool, for instance, needs to be adjusted, according 
to whether it is integrated into public transport 
vehicles or production machinery (IP1). The 
revenue model of all surveyed production-centred 
platforms therefore aims at the sale (or leasing) of 
SaaS applications in combination with consulting 
services that concern the implementation of IoT-
projects. Production-centred platforms therefore 
typically combine the function of a software 
distributor with consulting services: they provide 
assistance with adjustments between production 
equipment and software elements to customers that 
lack the specific knowledge of how to capitalize on 
the data generated through new digital devices.
Most platforms (PC2, PC4, PC5) offer off-the-
shelf monthly subscription plans to get access to 
more or less comprehensive platform functions. 
These can be complemented by more customized 
packages of apps and services. However, platforms 
can find additional sources of revenue as well, as 
the case of Siemens Mindsphere demonstrates. 
On the Mindsphere platform also complementors 
have to subscribe to access the platforms developer 
tools. Furthermore, Siemens as a company with 
a background in automation equipment, offers 
hardware components – the Mind Connect Elements 
– that facilitate a frictionless integration of devices 
by any manufacturer with the Mindsphere platform. 
(Siemens, 2017, pp. 8–9)
The service-centred character of the platforms’ 
business models means that the revenues of 
platforms are highly dependent on the success 
of their customers. There are strong reservations 
among manufacturers against paying for services 
and equipment without having any security about 
the concrete economic gains that can be achieved. 
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Some platform representatives reported that their 
customers enter the business relationship with 
a very pragmatic stance and that many were still 
waiting for proofs of concrete benefits (PC2a, 
PC2b, PC4a). The platforms’ business models 
thus depend on the fate of their customers: only if 
productivity gains actually materialize, they will be 
able to benefit from such progress.
6.4 Discussion: constraints to oligopolization
Production-centred IIP are acquiring a position in 
industrial GVCs that is of increasing importance: 
the function of enabling corporate customers 
to take advantage of data in order to improve 
processes and raise productivity. Unlike their 
peers in the consumer-oriented internet, however, 
the digital platforms of the industrial realm face 
stronger obstacles to acquire a dominant position 
which would enhance their bargaining power vis-
à-vis other network participants. Especially the 
constraints for unleashing same-side network 
effects, that are rooted in the unwillingness of 
corporate customers to share their data, makes an 
easy road towards market dominance in ‘winner-
takes-it-all’ markets impossible. It also is a barrier 
to revenue models that focus on the secondary 
usage of data, one of the main sources of revenue 
in the consumer-oriented internet.
Several interview partners nonetheless expected a 
consolidation of the market segment to a handful 
of large players. According to this perspective, 
only some platforms will manage to build vibrant 
software ecosystems while attracting a large number 
of industrial customers. One representative of a 
prominent platform assumed that the field will be 
fragmented along industry boundaries, whereas one 
platform might turn out as the main beneficiary in each 
segment (PC2a). However, due to the need to ensure 
interoperability with a heterogeneous hardware 
landscape and to attract SaaS complementors to 
the platform, production-centred platforms have to 
balance their monetary self-interest with the need to 
cooperate with complementors and customers on an 
equal footing. Or, in the words of one interviewee: 
“A platform is not by itself relevant. It is relevant in 
combination with its apps” (PC2b).
Crucially, the success of production-centred 
platforms depends on the capacity of their customers 
to raise productivity based on the provision of SaaS 
elements. The primary objective of production-
centred platforms is not to grow on cost of their 
customers, but to acquire a share of the prospected 
productivity. In a long-term perspective, however, 
the strongest production-centred platforms could 
gain bargaining power vis-à-vis other market 
participants in case they evolve towards oligopolies 
that could implement de facto standards. Even if 
the platforms’ ecosystems remained open, such 
a scenario would increase switching costs for 
customers and thus create lock-in effects.
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7 Distribution-centred platforms: introducing e-commerce to 
industry
7.1 Value Proposition: reducing transaction 
costs
Distribution-centred platforms function as B2B-
marketplaces by positioning themselves as 
matchmakers between manufacturers of supply 
products and their industrial customers. The 
platforms do not operate any manufacturing 
facilities by themselves but instead cooperate with 
networks of manufacturers. For the three platforms 
we studied these partner-networks range between 
240–6,000 companies.
One industry in which the distribution-centred 
platform model is expanding fast is mechanical 
component manufacturing. In Europe and the US, 
platform owners, usually start-ups that combine 
IT capabilities with a good knowledge of their 
target industries, act as intermediaries between 
mechanical component manufacturers and their 
customers.[5] The manufacturing services offered 
by complementors include laser, plasma and 
waterjet cutting, CNC turning, milling and drilling, 
and 3D printing for different kinds of metals and 
synthetic materials. The manufacturers offer their 
production capacities via the platform to customers 
in industries such as machine tools, aerospace, 
robotics, automotive and medical devices.
The platforms value proposition is very straight 
forward: they reduce transaction costs for their 
customers. They do so by reducing the time 
traditionally invested in finding and auditing 
suppliers and by simplifying interactions through 
a platform as digital interface, thus automating 
and standardizing the handling of orders, payment 
and contracts. One representative claimed that his 
platform reduces the time traditionally needed 
to fulfil an order by 50% (DC 1). Furthermore, 
the network of complementors allows for more 
flexibility especially at delivering time-sensitive 
orders. The disruptions to GVCs during the 
outbreak of Covid19 in the beginning of 2020 
accordingly have given these platforms a boost, as 
lead firms had to reorganize their supply chains and 
often looked for short-term replacements for failed 
transactions.
7.2 Platform Architectures: curating the 
manufacturing network
Distribution-centred platforms curate their network 
of manufacturing partners through rules of access 
and continuous performance-evaluation. As we 
will show, they can take advantage of cross-side 
network effects and some of the more advanced 
platforms utilize data to improve their services. This 
has significant consequences for manufacturers.
To become part of a platform’s network of 
manufacturing partners, firms have to provide 
detailed information on the production processes they 
offer and they have to pass a trial phase during which 
orders are closely monitored and evaluated along 
dimensions such as product quality, punctuality and 
fast communication. The mechanisms of monitoring 
and evaluation are institutionalized and become 
permanent over the course of the cooperation 
and they affect the likelihood to receive orders in 
the future. The factors that determine whether a 
particular manufacturer is chosen, however, remain 
opaque for manufacturers (DC2c, DC3).
To create and expand their network, distribution-
centred platforms make use of cross-side network 
effects. The platforms attractiveness to customers 
mainly rests on the range and flexibility of the 
manufacturing services offered. Both are largely 
rooted in the size and diversity of the – in some 
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cases global – network itself rather than in the 
flexibility of individual manufacturing partners 
(Butollo & Schneidemesser, 2021). Seen from the 
complementors’ side, a platform is most relevant 
if it has a solid base of industrial buyers which 
generates a steady flow of orders. Therefore, the 
expansion of the platform needs to achieve a good 
balance towards both user groups.
The three distribution-centred platforms we studied 
utilize the data they gather from transactions with 
customers and manufacturing partners in order 
to improve their services, but the extent to which 
they do so varies. One platform curates its network 
of manufacturers manually and allocates orders 
via email and telephone (DC2). Other platforms 
are particularly active in developing software 
elements such as instant pricing tools that automate 
aspects of the business relationship (in this case by 
calculating a binding price for a certain product). 
Such AI-based tools record the properties of a 
technical drawing, requested materials, required 
processing techniques, lead time and batch size 
and compare them with automatically-generated 
benchmarks from its vast database. One platform 
representative claimed that their self-learning 
algorithm has already analysed more than one 
million CAD-files to automatically calculate 
prizes (DC3). Another interviewee expressed the 
vision to establish a ‘universally agreed price for 
manufacturing that reflects supply and demand 
in the global market place’ based on the recorded 
data (DC1). Such approaches could tilt the 
bargaining relationship in favour of the platforms 
and result in enhanced competitive pressures for 
the manufacturing partners because the conditions 
become non-negotiable. This is particularly the case 
when platforms encompass firms from low-wage 
and high-wage countries that are put into direct 
competition with each other. Manufacturers then 
effectively are benchmarked against the globally 
most efficient, fastest and cheapest participants in 
the market. The same accounts for delivery lead 
times. The manager of one distribution-centred 
platform explains:
One of the things that we’re doing is kind of levelling 
standards across the globe. So, for example […] nor-
mally, the lead time in Europe is four to six weeks, whi-
le in America and Asia one to two weeks is normal. 
[…] And so, when we talk to European CNC suppliers, 
we tell them like, our standard auction for customers is 
two weeks. (DC1)
However, according to our interviews with platforms’ 
manufacturing partners, such pricing strategies are 
not necessarily experienced as a race to the bottom. 
Some of the manufacturers of our sample report no 
differences in revenues between orders that were 
transmitted through the platforms and orders that 
were received directly from customers without 
interference of platforms (com1DC, com2DC). 
Yet others reported that revenues on some orders 
processed through the platforms are significantly 
lower (com3DC, com4DC).
Another aspect that concerns the power relation 
between platforms and complementors is the 
relationship to customers. Manufacturing partners 
are cut off from direct interactions with industrial 
customers as it is the platforms that mediate 
these interactions, which are careful not to enable 
direct interactions between the two sides of their 
ecosystem. Direct relationships of manufacturers 
to customers, however, not only provide a 
certain stability in the business relationships, 
but also provide opportunities for more lucrative 
consulting activities that concern the pre-
production processes. As a direct interaction 
between manufacturing partners and customers 
is obstructed through the platforms, such services 
are monopolized by them while manufacturers 
only perform core manufacturing tasks, a potential 
functional impoverishment for the involved firms. 
Conversely, one platform in our sample was 
particularly ambitious in developing such pre-
production services by utilizing the vast amount of 
data on machine-part-designs and CAD-drawings 
that is uploaded to the platforms by their customers 
for automated testing of the manufacturability 
of designs or lead-time calculation (DC3). This 
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shows how – unlike the case of production-centred 
platforms – secondary use of data (CAD-designs as 
well as log-data) is exercised and provides a range 
of possibilities for distribution-centred platforms 
to extend their abilities to capture value from 
intangible functions.
7.3 Revenue model: fees on transactions
Distribution-centred platforms in the mechanical 
component industry earn a commission on 
every order that is handled. They charge for the 
matchmaking with a suitable supplier and for certain 
pre-production services. The platforms provide an 
attractive option for industrial customers to source 
components as they provide access to a flexible 
network of producers at very competitive prices. 
This offer is especially attractive in low volumes/
high mix industries in which customers often 
have the need to order very specific components. 
In such fields distribution-centred platforms have 
become relevant supplements to regular supply-
chain management practices that rely on direct 
transactions between producers and customers.
7.4 Discussion: towards e-commerce oligopolies 
in industry
Distribution-centred platforms enable industrial 
customers to source components more efficiently. 
This mainly implies a special kind of supplier 
governance through rules and evaluations set by 
the platform, the reliance on cross-side network 
effects and the charging of commissions on 
each transaction. As with production-centred 
platforms, there is a symbiosis between platforms 
and industrial companies that are involved in the 
platform ecosystems: manufacturing partners 
receive steady orders while the platforms 
benefit from their matchmaking activities. For 
manufacturing partners this is a two-edged sword: 
on the one hand they can benefit from additional 
sales channels and easy access to new customers, 
on the other hand they might lose opportunities in 
pre-production functions and become subjected to 
enhanced competitive pressure.
While effects on manufacturing partners thus 
are ambivalent, distribution-centred platforms 
prospectively will emerge as the main beneficiaries 
in the process, capturing large shares of revenues 
from the savings in transaction costs. If distribution-
centred business models turn out to be scalable and 
diversify across industries, an oligopolization that 
resembles developments in B2C e-commerce could 
be possible with similar implications: a growing 
dependency of sellers and customers. However, 
neither is it clear that market developments 
automatically result in oligopolistic structures (i.e. 
a fragmented landscape of specialized platforms 
could be an alternative scenario), nor can it be 
taken for granted that manufacturing partners 
(particularly those in low-wage countries) will 
suffer from the heightened competitive pressures. 
After all, many small-scale manufacturers choose 
to participate in the manufacturing networks of 
distribution-centred platforms because they benefit 
from the option of flexibly accepting orders that 
often are supplementary to their regular customer 
relationships (com3DC, com4DC). This way, they 
can indirectly access a market that lies beyond their 
(often regionally confined) reach and improve the 
utilization of their production capacities.
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8 Conclusion
Our discussion of the role of IIP in GVCs departed 
from reflections on the enhanced role of data in 
industrial processes and the observation that data 
often constitutes the raw material for ‘intangible 
assets’ that constitute an important variable for the 
distribution of revenues across firms. In the field 
of the consumer-oriented internet, digital platforms 
emerged as infrastructures to take advantage of 
new data-based business models. They acquired an 
extraordinarily strong economic role as oligopolies 
of the digital economy and challenged traditional 
companies in the sectors they are active in (e.g. 
retail, media, communication). Our article thus 
discussed the question of whether there could 
be similar tendencies at work in the realm of the 
industrial internet by empirically analysing two 
prominent platform types, production-centred and 
distribution-centred platforms.
The results of our investigation help to better 
understand the position that IIP acquire in GVCs. 
The analysed business models do not mainly aim 
at the usurpation of industrial data with the goal of 
monopolizing intangible assets, i.e. those resources 
that are paramount to capture value. Rather, they 
act as service providers and/or intermediaries that 
support manufacturing companies in reaping benefits 
from data, i.e. raising productivity of manufacturing 
processes or lowering transaction costs through 
efficient matchmaking. The success of both types 
of platform business models essentially depends on 
the capacity of their customers to generate revenue 
to which they contribute capabilities and of which 
they demand a share.
Hence the issue at stake is not whether industrial 
platforms will outcompete or replace industrial 
companies, but whether they emerge as strong 
service providers that maximise their revenues 
vis-à-vis traditional manufacturers. Their ability 
to do so decisively depends on the platforms’ 
ability to acquire power based on network 
effects. In this sense the trajectories of both 
platform types are different: Production-centred 
platforms cannot harvest same-side network 
effects as long as there remain obstacles to the 
sharing of industrial data. Instead, they need to 
curate a diverse network of complementors in 
order to create cross-side network effects, which 
is only possible if they keep their ecosystems 
open. Cross-side network effects could result in 
oligopolization as platforms mature, but there 
is also the option of a fragmented landscape 
of more specialized platforms that operate in 
the niches of their expertise (Sturgeon, 2019, 
p. 15). Distribution-centred platforms, on the 
contrary, show many similarities with regular 
e-commerce platforms with potentially strong 
cross-side network effects. This could enhance 
their power vis-à-vis industrial complementors 
and thus their leeway for charging for transaction 
services. What is more, these platforms do record 
the data from transaction processes, which 
implies an information asymmetry vis-à-vis their 
complementors (Staab, 2019) that allows them to 
improve and expand their match making qualities 
and their pre-production services.
In both surveyed fields, oligopolization eventually 
might preponderate. This mainly means that IIP 
will stabilize their position in GVCs. As in the 
consumer-oriented internet this means that they 
might replace traditional contenders in the field. In 
the case of production-centred platforms this mainly 
accounts for non-platform software distributers (not 
manufacturers). In the field of distribution-centred 
platforms this not only accounts for traditional trade 
intermediaries, but also for single manufacturers 
that pursue the goal of fast on-demand production 
of customized products. On a different path that 
harvests the flexibility of the network, distribution-
centred platforms thus could deliver, what the 
engineering-heavy strategy of Industry 4.0 promises 
(Butollo & Schneidemesser, 2021).
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Endnotes
[1] What is more, product markets are characterized by an increasing amount of digital services that are 
based on data. This is most evident in the telecommunication sector where the physical smart phone, 
merely acts as a carrier for a broad range of apps that can process data from daily interactions record-
ed through mobile devices (Thun & Sturgeon, 2019). Similar logics of an IoT-driven servitization of 
the economy are at work in the fields of connected cars, smart homes, smart cities and many other in-
dustries. The ability to acquire and process data and to develop digital service applications to this end 
becomes an important factor that shapes competition in a broad range of product equipment (Zysman, 
Murray, Feldman, Nielsen, & Kushida, 2011). In the field of mechanical engineering this means that 
some firms strive to develop software applications related to the steering of manufacturing processes 
and digital platforms to integrate such applications (Author, forthcoming).
[2] For instance, the primary strategic objective of an innovation platform is the growth of an ecosystem 
that comprises of diverse complementors that add applications, whereas transaction platforms, while 
also striving to expand the size of their reach, need to constantly improve their matchmaking tech-
niques in order to reduce frictions in transactions (Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019).
[3] We use the following labelling system for quoting interviews:  Each interviewee group has an abbrivi-
ation (IP=infrastructure provider, PC=production-centred platform, DC=distribution-centred platform, 
comPC=complementor of production-centred platform, comDC=complementor of distribution-centred 
platform). Each platform/complementor is assigned a number. If we refer to more than one interview 
conducted with the same platform/complementor this is indicated by small letters (a,b,c,…) after the 
number. E.g. the code PC2b refers to the second interview we had with a representative of produc-
tion-centred platform number 2 in our sample.
[4] The original German-language quotations are translated by the authors.
[5] In China a similar distribution-centred platform model can be observed in consumer goods manufac-
turing. There, the e-commerce company Alibaba (along with Pinduoduo and JD.com) is connecting 
consumer goods manufacturers and e-commerce retailers via a platform (Author).
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